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Following the papers of Broadberry (1993), Wolf (1994), Bernard and Jones (1996a, 1996b) and 
Carree et al. (2000), it is widely believed that labor productivity in manufacturing has not been 
converging across the OECD countries.
4 Bernard and Jones (1996a) conclude that the service sector 
has been  the  driving  force behind  the  finding of  economy-wide convergence in the lit erature.
5 
However, since trade in services has been low compared to trade in intermediate manufacturing 
goods, we would expect any international transmission of technology to be stronger in manufacturing 
than in services, to the extent that  convergence is driven by trade. Therefore, we should expect 
convergence in manufacturing  to have been more pronounced than convergence in services. Ben-
David (1993), for example, finds that the movement towards freer trade over the past century has 
been an important factor behind the per capita income convergence. This argument is supported by 
Baumol (1986) who argues that exp ansion  in exports  over the period 1870 to 1979   amplified 
international  competition  and,  consequently,  was   conducive  to  imitation  and  innovation. 
Furthermore,  the  “advantages  of  backwardness”  along  the  lines  of  Gerschenkron  (1962)  would 
suggest catching up to the frontier in all sectors of the economy (Dowrick and Gemmell, 1991, 
Bernard and Jones, 1996a). 
The convergence tests in the 1990s were often used to discriminate between first-generation 
endogenous growth theories and neoclassical growth theories under the assumption that endogenous 
growth models do not predict convergence (see for example Mankiw et al., 1992). However, only a 
very few of the early first-generation endogenous growth models do not predict convergence. Kelly 
(1992), for example, showed that convergence tends to occur in early first-generation endogenous 
growth models  when stochastic factor productivity is  introduced. More importantly,  endogenous 
growth models  have come a long way since then and have  increasingly  focused on the role of 
technology  transfer  and  absorptive  capacity  in  explaining  productivity  growth  across  countries 
(Eaton and Kortum, 1999, Howitt, 2000, Griffith et al., 2003, 2004, Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-
Foulkes, 2004, 2005, Madsen, 2008a,b). In the Schumpeterian models of Aghion and Howitt (2005), 
and Aghion et al., (2004, 2005), countries with highly productive R&D, adequate property right 
protection and good educational systems will converge. Furthermore, Madsen (2008b) finds that 
growth can be permanently  affected by knowledge spillovers.  This  puts  the convergence debate 
today into quite a different light from that of the 1990s. 
                                                           
4 Edward Wolff (1991) and Dollar and Edward Wolff (1988) do find convergence in manufacturing. However, Bernard 
and Jones (1996b) argue that there are problems associated with the data used by Dollar and Wolff (1988). 
5 For findings of economy-wide convergence among the OECD countries, see, for example, Baumol (1986), Baumol and 
Wolff (1988), Dowrick and Nguyen (1989), Sala-i-Martin (1996), and Madsen (2007). 3 
 
Distance to the frontier also plays a particularly important role in the convergence debate. 
Countries that are more backward technologically may have greater potential for generating rapid 
growth  than  more  advanced  countries  (Gerschenkron,  1962),  essentially  because  backwardness 
reduces the costs of creating new and better products (Howitt, 2000). However, backwardness needs 
not  automatically  lead  to  growth  since  the  increasing  complexity  of  products  requires  large 
investments in knowledge in order to take advantage of the technology developed elsewhere (Aghion 
et al., 2004, 2005). Large investments in R&D require a developed financial system that can provide 
inventors with sufficient capital to finance their R&D expenses (Aghion et al., 2004, 2005) and 
factory  workers,  technicians,  engineers,  and  managers  need  to  be  trained  to  use  technologies 
developed elsewhere (Hobday, 2003).  
  Taking into account the recent developments in endogenous growth theories, this paper tests 
for conditional and unconditional convergence in OECD manufacturing.  The contribution of the 
paper is two-fold. First, it considers a substantially longer data period than has previously been used 
in producing empirical estimates for a large sample of OECD countries. Second, it tests the extent to 
which  convergence  has  been  driven  by  R&D,  knowledge  spillovers,  human  capital,  financial 
development and the interaction between distance to frontier and human capital, research intensity 
and  financial  development,  following  the  prediction  of  second-generation  models  of  economic 
growth. Using a new dataset for the manufacturing sector covering up to 137 years for 19 OECD 
countries  this  paper  tests  1)  whether  manufacturing  total  factor  productivity  (TFP)  and  labor 
productivity  have  converged  over  time;  and  2)  whether  R&D,  human  capital,  international 
knowledge spillovers through the channel of imports, the distance to the frontier and the interaction 
between the distance to the frontier and financial development, human capital and research intensity 
have contributed to productivity convergence or divergence in manufacturing.  
The country sample used in the paper satisfies two important criteria. First, that the countries 
have good legal systems, a high quality educational system, and developed credit markets (Aghion 
and Howitt, 2005, Aghion et al., 2004, 2005). Second, that the sample includes countries that were 
well behind the technology frontier during the 19
th and a significant part of the 20
th century including 
Ireland, Japan, Portugal and Spain. Thus, the country sample, to a large extent, overcomes De Long‟s 
(1988) critique of country selection bias in Baumol‟s (1986) study of per capita GDP convergence 
among the industrialized countries since 1870. De Long‟s (1988) main concern was that most papers 
on  long-term  convergence  consisted  of  countries  that  were  already  well  developed  in  the  20
th 
century. Consequently, their results were biased towards the finding of convergence since countries 
that were likely to diverge in the twentieth century such as Argentina, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, 
were left out of the sample.  4 
 
  The next section discusses the convergence predictions of various growth theories including 
recent second-generation endogenous  growth models. Section 3 provides graphical evidence  and 
tests  of  unconditional  convergence,  while  Section  4  tests  for  conditional  and  unconditional 
convergence using a panel data approach. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Convergence in endogenous growth models 
Since  the  publication  of  Mankiw  et  al.  (1992)  it  has  been  widely  believed  that  first-generation 
endogenous  growth  models  do  not  predict  productivity  convergence.  However,  the  endogenous 
growth models referred to by Mankiw et al. (1992) were the simple “AK” type models, which were 
only used in a few early endogenous growth models and, as such, are unrepresentative of first-
generation  endogenous  growth models. The first-generation models  of  Lucas  (1988) and Romer 
(1990), for example, exhibit conditional convergence and each country converges to its own steady-
state growth rate. Due to the unwarranted property of proportionality between productivity growth 
and the number of R&D workers in first-generation endogenous growth models, they have been 
replaced by second-generation endogenous growth models; namely semi-endogenous growth models 
and Schumpeterian growth models.  
The semi-endogenous growth models by Jones (1995, 2002) and Kortum (1997) avoid scale 
effects and assume decreasing returns to knowledge stock. In the Schumpeterian growth models of 
Peretto (1996, 1998, 1999b), Aghion and Howitt (1998), Dinopoulos and Thompson (1998), Howitt 
(1999, 2000), and Peretto and Smulders (2002), R&D has to increase over time to keep economies 
growing at constant rates. This is because the increasing range of products as the economy expands 
lowers the productivity effects of R&D activity. Schumpeterian models dispose of the scale effects 
by the assumption that innovations occur at the firm level instead of at the economy-wide level. In 
other  words,  Schumpeterian  theory  shifts  the  focus  from  the  whole  economy  to  the  individual 
product line under the assumption that there is one product line per firm. 
  What do the second-generation growth models say about convergence? Semi-endogenous 
growth models possess the same steady state properties as the Solow model and, as such, predict 
conditional convergence (see for example Jones, 2002). Since growth is temporarily affected by 
growth in R&D and human capital, the transitional dynamics will be different from that of the Solow 
model. Jones (2002) shows that the transitional dynamics are slower in semi-endogenous growth 
models  than  in  the  Solow-Swan  model  because  of  the  interaction  between  fixed  capital  and 
knowledge. The Schumpeterian models developed by Peretto (1998, 1999a,b, 2003), Howitt (1999, 
2000), Aghion et al. (2004, 2005), Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005), and Aghion et al. (2006) also 
predict conditional convergence. To see this consider the following model of Aghion and Howitt 5 
 
(2005) in which there is a theoretical mechanism that drives equalization of growth rates in the long 
run. As long as a country innovates it will eventually start growing at the same rate as the leading 
countries.  On  the  other  hand,  countries  with  poor  macroeconomic  conditions,  institutions, 
educational systems and underdeveloped financial systems will stagnate.  
Aghion and Howitt (2005) demonstrate that country i‟s expected distance to the technological 
frontier,  , evolves according to the equation: 
 
    ,             (1) 
 
where  i  is  country  i‟s  innovation  rate,    is  the  global  innovation  rate,  and    is  the  size  of 
innovations. Country i‟s innovation rate is given by  , where n is productivity-adjusted 
research, f(n) is the research productivity function and   is R&D productivity. The distance from the 
frontier at time t-1 is given by  , where A is a productivity parameter and   is 
frontier technology.  
If   > 0, this differential equation is stable, which means as long as a country undertakes 
R&D at a constant intensity, n, its distance to the frontier will stabilize at zero and its growth rate 
will converge at the same rate as the growth rate at the technology frontier. If   = 0, there is no stable 
equilibrium and   diverges to infinity: the country stops innovating and will, therefore, have a long 
run productivity growth rate of zero.  
This framework shows that countries either fall into a group in which they converge to the 
frontier growth rate (i.e.   > 0) or a low income group (i.e.   = 0). The high income group consists of 
countries  with  highly  productive  R&D,  a  good  educational  system,  and  good  property  right 
protection. These countries will converge to the frontier growth rate (Howitt, 2000, Aghion et al., 
2004,  2005).  Countries  with  low  R&D  productivity,  poor  educational  system,  and  low  property 
rights will not grow at all. The countries considered in this paper have had appropriate institutions in 
most of the period 1870-2006 (see Jaggers and Marshall, 2007), at least some basic education at the 
turn of the 20
th century (Bayer et al., 2006), and have undertaken R&D throughout the whole period 
(Madsen, 2008a). Accordingly, these countries should converge. 
  More precisely, Aghion and Howitt (2005) show that a country undertakes R&D and catches 
up to the frontier if the marginal benefits from R&D exceed the marginal cost: 
 
  ,                  (2) 6 
 
 
where   is the price mark-up over marginal costs, which depends on property right protection, L is 
the supply of skilled labor, and m is the number of sectors in the economy. A country is more likely 
to  undertake  R&D  and  converge  to  the  growth  rate  of  the  frontier  country  the  better  is  the 
educational system, as measured by λ, the better is the protection of property rights, as measured by 
χ, and the more skilled is the labor force, as measured by L. Thus, in this model there is a clear 
mechanism that drives equalization of growth rates in the long run. This is a desirable property that is 
not shared by closed-economy growth models. 
  Aghion et al. (2004, 2005) and Aghion and Howitt (2005) extend this framework to allow for 
financial development. Financial development is important for convergence because it determines 
the degree to which borrowers choose to defraud creditors by concealing the profits of the R&D 
project in the event of success. Aghion et al. (2004, 2005) show that the more financially developed 
a country is, the more difficult it is to defraud creditors and the easier is the access to credit to 
undertake R&D. If credit markets are functioning perfectly Equation (2), modified with a one-period 
discount factor, will still hold. If credit markets, however, are imperfect, investment is limited by a 
fixed multiple of accumulated net wealth, which in turn, constitutes current per capita income. It 
follows that the further a country falls behind the frontier country the less the entrepreneur will be 
able invest in the R&D that is required to maintain a given frequency of innovations. If, on the other 
hand, the costs of defrauding are sufficiently high, even a very backward country can take advantage 
of its backwardness in the domain of the frequency of innovations. These considerations suggest that 
financial development plays a potentially important role for convergence, an issue that is examined 
in Section 4. 
3. Unconditional convergence 
3.1 Data 
The  country  sample  consists  of  the  following  19  OECD  countries:  Australia,  Belgium,  Canada, 
Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Ireland,  Italy,  Japan,  Netherlands,  New  Zealand,  Norway, 
Portugal,  Spain,  Sweden,  Switzerland,  United  Kingdom,  and  the  United  States.  Productivity  is 
measured as manufacturing labor productivity as well as TFP. The labor productivity data cover the 
period 1870 to 2006 while the TFP data cover the slightly shorter period 1900 to 2006 because data 
on  manufacturing  investment  are  only  available  for  a  few  countries  before  1900.  The  labor 
productivity data has the advantage over the TFP data in that it spans 30 years further back, while the 
TFP data has the advantage of catering for the feed-back effects from capital accumulation in the 
convergence regressions. Suppose that convergence is driven by capital accumulation as predicted by 7 
 
the neoclassical model. If labor productivity is regressed on R&D, distance to the frontier and other 
variables in the convergence regressions, one may come to the conclusion that the convergence is 
driven by R&D while, in fact, it is driven by capital accumulation because of a potentially high 
correlation between capital accumulation and the R&D variables.
6 TFP regressions ensure that the 
conditional variables considered below influence productivity through technological progress and not 
through capital accumulation. 
In contrast to  the majority of  studies on manufacturing productivity convergence ,  labor 
productivity and TFP are based on hours worked as opposed to number of workers. Bernard and 
Jones (1996b) claim that they are the first  to allow for hours worked. Adjustment for annual hours 
worked is particularly important in this study because annual hours worked has been  reduced to a 
half over the past 137 years and because the cross-country variation of hours worked has converged 
among the countries considered here ,  as shown below.  Labor productivity is measured by real 
manufacturing GDP in 2002 purchasing power parities (PPP) divided by manufacturing employment 
and the average annual hours actually worked per person in the non -agricultural sector. Hours 
worked in the non-agricultural sector is likely to be a good proxy for manufacturing hours worked 
since most  of the  changes in hours worked over  time have been driven by the number of public 
holidays and regulations regarding number of weekly hours worked.  
  The TFP estimates are based on the Cobb-Douglas production function, Y = K
α(AL)
1-α, where 
Y is manufacturing output, K is manufacturing capital stock, A is the level of technology, and L is 
total  employment  in  manufacturing  times  annual  hours  worked.  Harrod-neutral  technological 
progress is assumed to make the steady-state TFP growth rates comparable with the steady-state 
labor productivity growth rates. Here, A can be straightforwardly computed as: 
 
  . 
 
Capital stock is calculated from manufacturing investment using the perpetual inventory method and 
a depreciation rate of eight percent. Capital stock data are available for 11 countries in 1900 and 
gradually become available for the other countries after this period. The capital stock is available for 
all countries from 1950 except Australia and Switzerland. TFP is backdated using labor productivity 
in  the periods for which capital  stock is  not  available (see data  appendix for details).  Capital‟s 
income share, α, it set to 0.3 following the standard in the literature (see for instance Mankiw et al., 
1992, Jones, 2002, Madsen, 2008b). We have not allowed the income share of capital to vary over 
                                                           
6 We are grateful to a referee for pointing this out. 8 
 
time because only recent data on income shares are available and variation in income shares are more 
likely to reflect variations in rent extraction than changes in marginal productivities of production 
factors (see for example Bruno and Sachs, 1985, and Hall, 1988). Furthermore, Gollin (2002) shows 
that variations in factor shares across countries, particularly, and over time are heavily influenced by 
the  rate  of  self  employment.  Earnings  from  self  employment  are  recorded  as  profit  income  in 
national  accounts  although  the  labor  of  the  self  employed  should  be  attributed  labor  income. 
Correcting for imputed labor income of the self employed for a large sample of countries Gollin 
(2002) finds that income shares are quite constant across countries.
7 
  Before  WWII  the  manufacturin g  value  added  production  data  are   mostly  based  on 
manufacturing or industrial production figures obtained from surveys of establishments  or tax files, 
while  the  employment  data  are  often  based  on  census  surveys.  Since  alternative  sources  for 
manufacturing production and employment are not available before WWII, except in a couple of 
instances, the quality of our data cannot be checked against other sources. Regar ding annual hours 
worked, the analysis by  Madsen et al. (2010) suggests that the annual hours worked used in this 
study are at least as good as those of alternative sources. Although the manufacturing productivity 
data far back in time is not of the same quality as the manufacturing data available today, the data are 
probably of much better quality than the economy-wide productivity data, which have been used in 
most other convergence studies. The problem associated with economy-wide GDP data is that GDP 
cannot be measured adequately in several sectors of the economy including government and most 
private  services  including  health,  banking  and  insurance,  defence,  and  space  (Griliches,  1979). 
Furthermore,  historical  economy-wide  GDP  estimates  are  often  interpolated,  aggregated  over 
incomplete sectoral data or expenditure components, and based on indirect indicators. Manufacturing 
GDP data do not suffer from the same deficiencies and, as such, can give more reliable estimates of 
productivity than economy-wide estimates. 
 
3.2 Graphical analysis 
Figures 1 and 2 show the evolution of the log of labor productivity in the period 1870-2006, and the 
log of TFP in the period 1900-2006. Both graphs suggest convergence since the gap between the 
most productive and least productive countries has been decreasing over time. The indication of 
negative cross-sectional correlation between initial productivity and subsequent growth rate suggests 
-convergence. The US, the UK and Switzerland have been the countries with the highest labor 
                                                           
7 Peretto and Seater (2008) show that technological progress endogenously reduces the output elasticity of the non-
reproducible factors of production such as land and natural resources. Since land is not an important factor of production 
in manufacturing our estimates are unlikely to be influenced by the Peretto-Seater effect. 9 
 
productivities during most of the period. In terms of TFP, Japan took over as the most productive 
nation after 1970. Portugal has had the lowest labor and total factor productivities during the whole 
sample  period  and  ceased  to  converge  to  the  mean  over  the  past  three  decades.  This  poor 
performance  over  the  past  three  decades  has  also  been  observed  by  the  OECD  (2004),  which 
attributes the low growth to inefficient allocation of capital equipment in the business sector, late 
adoption of new technologies, low levels of education compared to other OECD countries, poor 







Since  -convergence is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for convergence (Sala-i-Martin, 
1996) it is also necessary to consider  -convergence. Figure 3 shows marked  -convergence. The 
standard deviation in 1998 was a quarter of that in 1870 for labor productivity and a third of that in 
1900 for TFP. The convergence is concentrated in the 20
th century. The slight divergence since 1998 
is due to the Irish productivity boom that pushed Ireland ahead of the other countries, combined with 
Portugal falling further behind. Overall, there seems to be clear evidence of  -convergence in labor 
productivity over the past 137 years and in TFP over the past 107 years. Finally, Figure 4 shows a 
clear  decline  in  the  variation  of  hours  worked  in  our  country  sample,  with  a  significant  fall 
immediately after WWII. This fall was predominantly driven by a marked reduction in hours worked 
in Japan and Germany towards the mean. In total, there has been a 75% reduction in the cross 
country standard deviation in annual hours worked in the period 1870-2006. 
 
 
Note. The standard deviation is based on the log of productivity and the levels of annual hours worked. 
 
3.3 Tests of unconditional convergence 
This  section  tests  for  unconditional  -convergence  as  well  as  -convergence.  Testing  for   
convergence involves the following two regressions: 
 
  ,    i = 1, 2,…, 19,       (3) 
and 
  ,   i = 1, 2,…, 19,       (4) 
 
where   is the average labor productivity growth rate in the period 1870-2006,   is 
the average TFP growth rate in the period 1900-2006,  ,  ,   and   are constants,   and 11 
 
 are the initial productivities for country i, and   is a stochastic error term. Here,   and  ‟ 
determine the relationship between initial productivities and subsequent growth rates. 
 
Table 1. Parameter estimates of Eqs. (3) and (4). 
 
     
 
  0.074      0.099 
 
(0.000)      (0.000) 
  -0.007      -0.010 
 
(0.000)      (0.000) 
  0.83      0.80 
Notes. The numbers in parentheses are p-values. The estimation period is 
1870-2006 for labor productivity and 1900-2006 for TFP. 
 
The results of regressing Eqs. (3) and (4) are shown in Table 1. Since the estimated coefficients of   
and  ‟ are negative and highly significant at conventional levels of significance, the null hypothesis 
of no  -convergence is easily rejected. This confirms the graphical evidence above that countries 
with high levels of productivity in 1870 or 1900 have been growing at slower rates during the period 
1870-2006 or 1900-2006 than countries with lower initial productivity levels.  
The tests developed by Lichtenberg (1994) and Carree and Klomp (1997) are used to test for 
-convergence.  The  test  statistic  of  Lichtenberg  (1994)  is  constructed  as    and  has  an  F 
distribution with (  degrees of freedom in both the numerator and the denominator. Here   is 
the cross-country variance of labor productivity in the first period, T0, (1870 or 1900),  is the 
variance in the last period, T, (2006), and N is the number of countries in our sample. The likelihood 
ratio test of Carree and Klomp (1997) is constructed as follows: 
 
  ,  
 
where   is the productivity covariance between period T and T0. The test statistic is distributed as 
 under the null hypothesis of no convergence. The results from these two tests are presented in 
Table 2. Both tests give evidence of  -convergence in manufacturing labor productivity and TFP at 
the 1-percentage significance level. 
 
Table 2. Sigma convergence tests. 
 
   
 12 
 
Lichtenberg's test  5.57    3.86 
 
[3.24]    [3.24] 
Likelihood-ratio test  11.12    7.02 
 
[6.63]    [6.63] 
Note.  The  numbers  in  square  brackets  are  critical  values  at  the  one  percent 
significance level. 
 
3.4 Robustness tests of unconditional convergence 
This  sub-section  investigates  the  robustness  of  the  convergence  tests  to  1)  the  exclusion  of 
„problematic‟ countries; 2) the sample used by Bernard and Jones (1996b); and 3) different PPP base 
years.  The  first  rows  (Case  1)  in  Table  3  address  De  Long‟s  (1988)  sample  selection  issue  by 
examining whether our results  are sensitive to  the exclusion of the four „problematic‟ countries 
mentioned  in  his  paper,  namely,  Ireland,  Portugal,  Spain  and  New  Zealand.  Excluding  these 
countries from our sample has negligible effects on the results obtained in the previous sub-section. 
There is strong evidence of  -convergence as well as  -convergence when the four „problematic‟ 
countries are excluded.  
 
Table 3. Robustness tests of unconditional convergence. 






  -0.007  14.283  17.902 
 
(0.000)  [3.905]  [6.635] 
  -0.010  8.052  11.829 
 
(0.000)  [3.905]  [6.635] 
---------------------------------------CASE 2--------------------------------------- 
  -0.029  2.500  3.722 
 
(0.009)  [4.155]  [6.635] 
  -0.020  1.543  1.164 
 
(0.025)  [4.155]  [6.635] 
---------------------------------------CASE 3--------------------------------------- 
Our Y/Emp from B&J  -0.024  1.602  1.102 
 
(0.018)  [4.155]  [6.635] 
Y from B&J/ Our Emp  -0.032  1.251  0.179 
 
(0.027)  [4.155]  [6.635] 
Our Y/ Emp from ILO  -0.027  1.596  0.961 
 
(0.016)  [4.155]  [6.635] 
Our data and B&J‟s PPP  -0.034  1.851  1.398 
 
(0.005)  [4.155]  [6.635] 
---------------------------------------CASE 4--------------------------------------- 
 using 1990 PPP  -0.007  7.193  14.009 
 
(0.000)  [3.242]  [6.635] 
 using 1980 PPP  -0.008  6.254  12.307 
   (0.000)  [3.242]  [6.635] 
using 1990 PPP  -0.010  4.527  8.760 
  (0.000)  [3.242]  [6.635] 13 
 
 using 1980 PPP  -0.010  4.266  8.086 
   (0.000)  [3.242]  [6.635] 
 
Notes. The numbers in round parentheses are p-values while critical values at the one percent level are in 
square brackets. Case 1. The four „problematic‟ countries (Ireland, Portugal, Spain and New Zealand) are 
excluded from the sample. Case 2. The sample period and country sample of Bernard and Jones (1996b) 
(B&J) is used. Case 3. The employment data of Bernard and Jones (1996b) and our income data are used in 
the first row of this case. The income data of Bernard and Jones and our employment data are used in the 
second row of this case. Our income data and ILO‟s employment data are used in the third row of this case. 
Our data converted to PPP by B&J‟s PPP in the fourth row of this case. Productivity is measured as labor 
productivity in Case 3. Case 4. 1980 and 1990 PPPs (instead of 2002 PPP in the baseline case) are used as 
conversion factors.  
 
Case  2  considers  the  country  sample  and  time  period  of  Bernard  and  Jones  (1996b)  using  our 
productivity  data  (their  sample  consists  of  the  following  14  countries  in  the  period  1970-87: 
Australia,  Belgium,  Canada,  Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Italy,  Japan,  Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden, the UK, and the US). The estimated coefficients of  -convergence are quite close 
to the ones obtained by Bernard and Jones (1996b); however, in contrast to the finding of Bernard 
and Jones (1996b), the null hypothesis of no  -convergence is rejected at conventional significance 
levels.  
  This raises the question as to why the null hypothesis of no  -convergence is rejected in our 
sample but not in Bernard and Jones‟s. To investigate this issue Case 3 in Table 3 considers 1) our 
income but their employment data; 2) our employment but their income data; 3) ILO‟s employment 
data as opposed to the OECD employment data (which are used by Bernard and Jones as well as in 
this paper); and 4) their PPP conversion values. In all these instances there is still evidence of  -
convergence but not  -convergence. These results suggest that the conflicting results between this 
paper and Bernard and Jones reflect revision of the income and employment data. Data are often 
revised several years back in time and can sometimes result in significant changes. Comparing their 
data with ours reveals that the discrepancy is quite small. In this context it is important to note that 
there  are  only  small  differences  between  their  and  our  results:  the  null  hypothesis  of  no  -
convergence cannot be rejected in our as well as in their case during the period 1970-87, there is no 
significant difference between the estimated   coefficients at conventional significance levels, and 
the null of no  -convergence is even rejected by Bernard and Jones if a one-sided 10-percentage 
benchmark  significance  level  is  applied.
8  The  discrepancy  is ,  therefore,  small  and  the 
                                                           
8 Bernard and Jones (1996b) say that they find no convergence at the 10 percentage level. This conclusion is based on a 
two-sided critical value. We base our conclusion on a one-sided critical value because we test whether   < 0 and not 
whether   is significantly different from zero. 14 
 
inconclusiveness ultimately rests on the very short and volatile data period chosen by Bernard and 
Jones. Had a longer sample period been chosen, the results would, in all likelihood not have been 
sensitive to later revisions of the data. 
Finally, in his comments on the paper by Bernard and Jones (1996b), Sørensen (2001) argues 
that,  whether a particular sample of countries  exhibits  productivity  convergence depends  on the 
choice of base year. Extending the sample used by Bernard and Jones by six years, Sørensen (2001) 
finds  that  the  earlier  the  base  year,  the  lesser  is  the  evidence  of  productivity  convergence  in 
manufacturing. To investigate this issue, we check the robustness of our results using 1980 and 1990 
PPPs  (instead  of  2002  PPP)  as  conversion  factors  (Case  4).  The  test  results  in  Table  3  show 
significant evidence of  -convergence as well as  -convergence. The null hypothesis is strongly 
rejected in all cases. In conclusion, our results seem to be invariant to the choice of PPP base year, 
providing  a  higher  degree  of  confidence  of  -  and  -convergence  in  manufacturing  labor 
productivity and TFP.  
 
4. Panel estimates of convergence 
The finding of unconditional convergence raises the question of which factors have been responsible 
for the convergence. Panel estimates are undertaken in this section to examine whether innovation 
based  variables,  human  capital,  and  distance  to  the  frontier  can  account  for  convergence  and 
manufacturing productivity growth. Restricted and unrestricted versions of the following model are 
estimated: 
  (5) 
 
where the superscripts d and f stand for foreign and domestic,   is labor productivity for country i 
in period t,  is labor productivity at the start of each period over which the long differences are 
taken, H is educational attainment (average years of schooling among the adult population), Pat is 
the number of patent applications, Emp is economy-wide employment,   is country dummies, and 
DWWII  is  a dummy variable taking the value 1 before WWII (1950) and 0 afterwards, which  is 
included  to  capture  the  increasing  productivity  growth  in  the  post  1950-period  that  may  not  be 
accounted  for  by  the  explanatory  variables.  Finally,    measures  the  distance  to  the 
technological frontier at the beginning of each period and is measured as ln(y
US/yi), where y
US is 15 
 
manufacturing productivity in the US. Equation (5) is also regressed using TFP instead of y. In these 
regressions the initial productivity and the distance to the frontier are also measured in terms of TFP. 
The model is estimated in 5, 10 and 15 year differences to filter out business cycle influences. 
All variables are measured as average annualized growth rates and research intensities, (Pat/Emp), 
are measured as the average in the period  over which the first-differences span. The innovative 
activity is measured by the total number of patents applied for, since patents are the only presently 
available data on innovative activity dating back to 1870. Patents are normalized by economy-wide 
employment and not manufacturing employment because the number of patents covers the whole 
economy. Economy-wide patents are used because industrial patents are only available for some 
countries and mostly cover a short time-span. 
  The model is deliberately made as inclusive as possible 1) to prevent omitted variable biases; 
2) to test for the possibility that knowledge can have both permanent and temporary growth effects 
following the predictions of second-generation endogenous growth models; and 3) to ensure that as 
many factors as possible that can potentially explain growth and convergence are included in the 
model.  The  predictions  of  the  two  leading  second  generation  growth  models,  namely  semi-
endogenous growth theory and Schumpeterian growth theory, are allowed for in the estimates. While 
the semi-endogenous growth theory by Jones (1995) abandons scale effects in ideas production, the 
Schumpeterian growth models of Aghion and Howitt (1998), Peretto (1996, 1998), Howitt (1999, 
2000) and Peretto and Smulders (2002) maintain scale effects but assume that the effectiveness of 
R&D dilutes due to the proliferation of products as the economy expands. 
The two second generation models have quite different implications for growth. As shown by 
Laincz  and  Peretto  (2006)  and  Madsen  (2008b),  Schumpeterian  theory  predicts  that  labor 
productivity is growing proportionally with research intensity, which is measured as patents divided 
by employment in the estimates of Madsen (2008b). Patents are divided by employment to allow for 
product proliferation and increasing complexity of new innovations as productivity increases (Ha and 
Howitt,  2007).  Similarly,  Peretto  (1999b)  shows  that  an  employment-induced  increase  in  firms‟ 
profit rates brings the growth rate temporarily up to a higher level because the incumbents invest 
more  in  R&D.  The  higher  rate  of  profit  induces  an  entry  of  new  firms,  which  in  turn  attracts 
employees of the incumbents. This process continues until the rate of profit and the productivity 
growth rates slow down and revert towards their original steady state levels.  
Growth can still be sustained at a constant rate in the Schumpeterian framework if R&D is 
kept in a fixed proportion of the number of product lines, which is in turn proportional to the size of 
population in steady state. As such, to ensure sustained TFP growth, R&D has to increase over time 
to counteract the increasing range and complexity of products that lowers the productivity effects of 16 
 
R&D activity. Similarly, the Schumpeterian model of Aghion et al. (2006) predicts that TFP growth 
is proportional to educational attainment, which implies that the growth rate will remain positive as 
long as the labor force has some education.  
Semi-endogenous growth theory, by contrast, assumes that educational attainment and R&D 
have only temporary growth effects (see for example Jones, 2002). Accordingly, productivity growth 
rates are positively related to growth in R&D and the change in educational attainment. Positive 
productivity growth is only feasible as long as  educational attainment  and R&D are growing at 
positive rates. In steady state this means that population growth rates have to be positive to get 
positive productivity growth rates (Laincz and Peretto, 2006).  
  The growth in foreign patents and foreign research intensity affect growth following Coe and 
Helpman (1995) and Madsen (2007, 2008a, 2008b), in which productivity growth is affected by 
knowledge spillovers through the channel of imports. The idea behind this spillover hypothesis is 
that the variety and the quality of intermediate inputs are predominantly explained by R&D and, 
therefore, productivity is a positive function of R&D. Consequently, the productivity of a country 
depends on its own R&D and the R&D embodied in imported intermediate inputs and, therefore, that 
technology is transmitted internationally by import-weighted R&D. Here, imports of technology are 
allowed to follow the semi-endogenous growth hypothesis through the growth in foreign patents, and 
in  the  Schumpeterian  growth  theory  through  foreign  research  intensity.
  9  Knowledge  spillovers 
through the channel of imports are not only important because they play an important role for growth 
in endogenous growth models but also because trade has often been highlighted as playing a key role 
in facilitating convergence (see for example Nelson and Wright, 1992, and Ben-David, 1993).  
  The  DTF  term  captures  the  idea  that  there  are  benefits  to  backwardness,  following  the 
historical  analysis  of  Gerschenkron  (Howitt,  2000)  and  the  empirical  analysis  of  Dowrick  and 
Gemmel  (1991).  The  distance  to  the  frontier  also  impacts  on  productivity  by  interacting  with 
research intensity. In the Schumpeterian model of Howitt (2000), a country takes advantage of its 
                                                           
9 Imports of patents through the channel of trade of country i, Pat
f, are based on the following weighting schedules 
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where Mij is nominal imports of goods from country j to country i, and 
n
j Y  is nominal income of country j.  
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backwardness  directly through the distance to  the frontier  and indirectly  through the interaction 
between the absorptive capacity and the distance to the frontier. In Howitt‟s (2000) model, it is R&D 
intensity that draws a country to the technology frontier and the higher is the research intensity, the 
faster the country converges to the technology frontier. The interaction between DTF and educational 
attainment  is  included  in  the  estimates  to  allow  for  the  possibility  that  education  enhances  the 
absorptive capacity of a country following the hypotheses of Nelson and Phelps (1966) and Howitt 
and Mayer-Foulkes (2005). 
 
4.1 Estimation method 
The model is regressed using the corrected least squares dummy variable (LSDV) of Kiviet (1995). 
The appendix reports the results when alternative estimators are used. The results remain  almost 
unaltered using these estimators. The LSDV estimator is bias-corrected as parameter estimates using 
the traditional uncorrected LSDV estimator can be substantially biased in samples with small T’s like 
ours (in our sample T = 27, T = 14, and T = 9 when using 5-year, 10-year, and 15-year intervals 
respectively). Based on Monte Carlo simulations, Kiviet (1995) finds that this corrected estimator is 
very accurate for small values of N and T and is more efficient than several IV estimators. 
 
4.2 Panel tests of unconditional convergence 
Before regressing Eq. (5) we examine whether the findings of unconditional convergence from the 
previous sections can be maintained using the panel approach. While we tested for convergence in 
2006 relative to 1870 or 1900 in the previous estimates, the panel approach tests for  -convergence 
in period t relative to the periods t-5, t-10 and t-15, where t is measured in years. The estimation 
results are reported in Table 4. The estimated coefficients of initial productivity,  , are consistently 
negative and highly significant, which reinforces the finding of unconditional convergence in the 
previous  sections.  The  speed  of  adjustment  is  higher  in  the  TFP  estimates  than  in  the  labor 
productivity estimates, which may reflect that the convergence speed is watered down in the labor 
productivity regressions by the period 1870-1900, during which convergence was absent.  
 
Table 4. Tests of unconditional convergence. 
   5 years  10 years  15 years 
  
           
  -0.119  -0.141  0.117  0.146  0.078  0.073 
 
(0.011)  (0.006)  (0.073)  (0.056)  (0.366)  (0.478) 
  -0.010  -0.022  -0.009  -0.016  -0.015  -0.033 
 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 18 
 
  -0.044  -0.056  -0.035  -0.040  -0.049  -0.079 
 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Note: The numbers in parentheses are p-values.  
 
4.3 Conditional convergence 
Unrestricted and restricted estimates of Eq. (5) are displayed in Tables 5-7, where the coefficients 
that are restricted to zero in the restricted model using the general-to-specific procedure with the 
five-percent benchmark level (the lagged dependent variables and the initial productivity variables 
are maintained in the restricted regressions). The estimated coefficients of initial productivity are 
consistently statistically insignificant, even at the five percentage significance level, regardless of 
whether the estimates are in 5, 10 or 15 year differences and whether or not the models are restricted. 
This result is very important because it shows that the manufacturing productivity convergence is 
driven by the conditional variables included in  Eq. (5). This is  also  a  strong result  because the 
estimated coefficients  of initial  productivity  were extraordinarily significant  in  the unconditional 
regressions in Table 4. As such, powerful conditional variables are required to render the initial 
productivity level insignificant. 
 
Table 5. Estimates of Eq. (5) in 5-year intervals  
 
 
Labor Productivity  TFP 
5 years  Full 
Model 
Restricted 
Model  Full Model  Restricted 
Model 
  -0.086  -0.087  -0.062  -0.074 
 
(0.073)  (0.056)  (0.251)  (0.181) 
  -0.008  -0.004  -0.008  0.002 
 
(0.356)  (0.413)  (0.527)  (0.815) 
  0.028  0.025  0.016  0.020 
 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.247)  (0.132) 
  0.004  0.005  0.003  0.003 
 
(0.228)  (0.168)  (0.520)  (0.507) 
  0.008  0.011  0.019  0.017 
 
(0.016)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
  0.005  0.005  0.006  0.007 
 
(0.032)  (0.010)  (0.051)  (0.018) 
  0.205  0.196  0.240  0.210 
 
(0.019)  (0.026)  (0.030)  (0.043) 
  -0.035  -0.034  -0.031  -0.030 
 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.004)  (0.005) 
  0.045  0.024  0.032  0.046 
 
(0.055)  (0.000)  (0.361)  (0.000) 
  -0.015     0.005    
 
(0.382)     (0.829)    
  0.005     -0.004    19 
 
 
(0.061)     (0.517)    
  0.016     0.030    
   (0.534)     (0.331)    
Note: The numbers in parentheses are p-values.  
 
Table 6. Estimates of Eq. (5) in 10-year intervals  
 
Labor Productivity  TFP 
10 years  Full 
Model 
Restricted 
Model  Full Model  Restricted 
Model 
  0.133  0.131  0.232  0.205 
 
(0.047)  (0.042)  (0.000)  (0.002) 
  -0.006  -0.002  -0.010  0.003 
 
(0.431)  (0.658)  (0.468)  (0.704) 
  0.009  0.009  0.000  0.004 
 
(0.016)  (0.006)  (0.968)  (0.532) 
  0.002  0.002  0.001  0.001 
 
(0.412)  (0.360)  (0.826)  (0.823) 
  0.008  0.009  0.016  0.011 
 
(0.007)  (0.000)  (0.004)  (0.035) 
  0.004  0.004  0.004  0.006 
 
(0.034)  (0.013)  (0.149)  (0.051) 
  0.070  0.060  0.051  0.028 
 
(0.045)  (0.093)  (0.409)  (0.624) 
  -0.027  -0.026  -0.023  -0.021 
 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.017)  (0.020) 
  0.032  0.022  0.007  0.036 
 
(0.152)  (0.001)  (0.833)  (0.002) 
  -0.010     0.015    
 
(0.532)     (0.488)    
  0.002     -0.006    
 
(0.598)     (0.127)    
  0.013     0.039    
   (0.523)     (0.251)    
Note: The numbers in parentheses are p-values.  
 
Table 7. Estimates of Eq. (5) in 15-year intervals  
 
Labor Productivity  TFP 
15 years  Full Model  Restricted 
Model  Full Model  Restricted 
Model 
  0.148  0.119  0.270  0.211 
 
(0.054)  (0.124)  (0.005)  (0.035) 
  -0.019  0.001  -0.019  0.046 
 
(0.104)  (0.921)  (0.737)  (0.057) 
  0.007  0.010  -0.003  0.003 
 
(0.082)  (0.020)  (0.745)  (0.788) 
  0.003  0.003  0.005  0.006 
 
(0.101)  (0.096)  (0.193)  (0.113) 
  0.012  0.012  0.036  0.030 
 
(0.004)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.002) 20 
 
  0.024  0.018  0.061  0.060 
 
(0.076)  (0.214)  (0.120)  (0.142) 
  0.104  0.068  0.136  0.074 
 
(0.024)  (0.099)  (0.125)  (0.374) 
  -0.033  -0.030  -0.021  0.000 
 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.543)  (0.996) 
  0.038  0.031  0.026  0.120 
 
(0.178)  (0.000)  (0.661)  (0.000) 
  -0.015     0.026    
 
(0.502)     (0.520)    
  0.002     -0.016    
 
(0.616)     (0.052)    
  0.060     0.148    
   (0.082)     (0.143)    
Note: The numbers in parentheses are p-values.  
 
Turning to the conditional variables, the regression results show that manufacturing productivity 
growth has been driven by domestic and foreign R&D intensity, and the distance to the technology 
frontier. The estimated coefficients of domestic research intensity are consistently significant in all 
the regressions and highly significant in many of the regressions, implying that R&D has permanent 
growth effects as predicted by Schumpeterian growth theories. As long as R&D is kept as a constant 
proportion of the number of product lines, domestic R&D will keep manufacturing productivity 
growth rates constant, ceteris paribus.  
The coefficients of the growth in domestic patents are consistently significant in the labor 
productivity regressions, however, they are consistently insignificant in the TFP regressions, which 
could be due to a positive correlation between the growth in patents and capital stock as discussed in 
Section 2. Considering only the labor productivity regressions, the overall regression results are not 
consistent with the predictions of semi-endogenous growth theory, even in the regressions where the 
coefficients of growth in patents are significant. Semi-endogenous growth theory predicts that a one-
off  increase  in  the  level  of  R&D  has  only  temporary  growth  effects.  However,  the  permanent 
positive growth effects of research intensity ensure that R&D has permanent growth effects. Thus, an 
increase in the number of patents issued every period in time permanently increases the productivity 
growth rate; however, the productivity effects are higher in the short run than in the long run, a result 
that is consistent with the transitional dynamics in the models of Peretto (1998, 1999b). 
  The foreign knowledge spillover variables give further evidence in favor of Schumpeterian 
growth  theory.  The  estimated  coefficients  of  the  growth  in  imports  of  foreign  patents  are 
insignificant  in  all  of  the  regressions,  while  most  of  the  estimated  coefficients  of  foreign  R&D 
intensity spillovers in the 5-year and the 10-year difference regressions are statistically significant. 
They  are  less  significant  in  the  15-year  estimates  because  the  number  of  observations  is  small 21 
 
compared to the 5-year and the 10-year estimates. These results point towards permanent growth 
effects of R&D spillovers through the channel of imports and show that the choice of trade partners 
is important for the benefits derived from trade. These results are consistent with the economy-wide 
estimates by Madsen (2008b) and the predictions of the Schumpeterian models of Peretto (2003) in 
which an economy that opens up to trade generates a larger and more competitive market in which 
firms have access to more diverse technologies, which in turn enhances growth.  
The favorable results of Schumpeterian growth theory are consistent with the findings of 
Laincz and Peretto (2006), Ha and Howitt (2007) and, particularly, Madsen (2008b), and Madsen et 
al. (2009, 2010). Madsen (2008b) and Madsen et al. (2009, 2010) find that economy-wide growth 
has been driven by research intensity in the OECD countries since 1870, the UK since 1620 and 
India since 1953 and find no evidence for semi-endogenous theory. These studies and this paper, 
therefore, show that growth has been governed by the Schumpeterian model throughout the first and 
second industrial revolutions in the UK, the transition from Hindu growth rates to spectacular growth 
rates in India, and the transition from the post-Malthusian growth regime to modern growth rates in 
the OECD countries. The only difference between the findings is that the estimated coefficients of 
research intensity are consistently more statistically significant here than in the estimates of Madsen 
(2008b) and Madsen et al. (2009, 2010), suggesting that manufacturing productivity advances are 
driven more directly by innovations in manufacturing than non-manufacturing or that manufacturing 
productivity data are of better quality than non-manufacturing productivity data. The importance of 
these results is that Schumpeterian growth theory appears to have general validity and is not limited 
to certain sectors of the economy, certain countries and certain stages of development.  
  The estimated coefficients  of the distance to  the frontier  are significantly positive in  the 
restricted regressions, however, they are not in the unrestricted regressions. This may reflect a high 
degree of correlation between DTF, ln(Pat/Emp)DTF, H(DTF), H and ln(Pat/Emp). Similar results 
for economy-wide estimates are found by Madsen (2008b). The significance of DTF shows that off-
frontier countries  benefit  from  the technologies that  are developed at  the frontier.  This  result is 
consistent with Gerschenkron‟s (1962) hypothesis that off-frontier countries with good institutions 
can take advantage of backwardness by adopting the technologies that are developed at the frontier. 
The further away a country is from the technology frontier, the lower the costs of innovations. It 
follows that the growth potential of a backward country is much larger than for a country close to or 
at the technology frontier.  
The estimated coefficients of the level of educational attainment are insignificant at the 5% 
level  in  all the regressions, while those of the change in  educational  attainment  are statistically 
significant in the 5-year difference estimates, however, they are barely significant in the 10 and 15-22 
 
year difference estimates. This result is consistent with the observation that educational attainment 
has increased almost ten-fold over the period from 1870 to 2006 while the productivity growth rates 
have only increased modestly during the same period, as pointed out by Pritchett (2006).  
Does this mean that scale effects in human capital have to be abandoned? Not necessarily. In 
the human capital driven endogenous growth models, human capital is conceptually broader than 
educational attainment. Human capital encompasses educational attainment, the quality of education, 
vocational training, on-the-job training, and learning-by-doing, which is enhanced every time a new 
product is introduced. Thus, educational attainment may not be an adequate proxy for human capital. 
Furthermore,  the  educational  attainment  data  are  not  likely  to  be  accurate.  The  educational 
attainment data of Baier et al. (2006), which are used here, are constructed from school enrolment 
data going back 50 years before the educational attainment data starts (1870). Since there is very 
little information about school enrolment before 1870 for many countries in the Mitchell series, for 
instance Mitchell (1983), which is the prime source used by Baier et al. (2006), the educational 
attainment data are measured with large errors, particularly before WWI. Thus, the regressions may 
not have captured the genuine effects of the level of human capital.  
 
4.4 Financial development, openness and conditional convergence 
To investigate further which factors have been responsible for the convergence and to check the 
robustness of the results in Tables 5-7 this sub-section extends the models estimated above to allow 
for financial development, the interaction between financial development and the distance to frontier 
and  openness.  As  discussed  in  Section  2  financial  development  plays  an  important  role  in  the 
convergence debate. According to Aghion et al. (2004, 2005) off-frontier countries need a certain 
level of financial development to take advantage of their backwardness. The higher are the costs of 
defrauding  a  creditor  the  more  likely  it  is  that  the  advantage  of  backwardness  exceeds  the 
disadvantage of backwardness. In addition, the more effective and developed are the institutions, the 
higher are the costs of defrauding and the more a country can take advantage of its backwardness.  
  Following  Aghion  et  al.  (2004,  2005)  the  financial  development  hypothesis  is  tested  by 
adding financial development and the interaction between financial development and the distance to 
the frontier to the restricted regression model considered in Tables 5-7: 
 
 
  ,  (6) 
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where F is an indicator for financial development and OP is openness and is measured as the imports 
of goods divided by nominal GDP. The level of human capital, the interaction between DTF and 
human  capital  and  the  interaction  between  DTF  and  research  intensity  are  excluded  from  the 
regressions because they were insignificant in the regressions reported in Tables 5-7 and remained 
insignificant when they were added to Eq. (6). The model of Aghion et al. (2004, 2005) predicts that 
 > 0 and that   = 0.
10 The model predicts that   = 0 because the effect of financial development 
on growth vanishes once a country reaches a certain level of financial development. 
  Financial development is measured as bank assets divided by nominal GDP. This measure is 
closely related to the ratio of credit to the private sector to nominal GDP , which is used as the 
preferred measure by Aghion et al. (2004, 2005). Bank assets predominantly consist of lending and 
investment in assets such as bonds and equity, where lending is by far the most important item on 
banks‟ asset side (IMF, International Financial Statistics). Bank assets are used as an indicator of 
financial development because statistics on credit to the private sector are not available for most 
countries before 1950.  
  Note that innovations influence productivities through patenting as well as through financial 
development in Eq. (6). In the model of Aghion et al. (2004, 2005) financial development affects 
productivity growth through the channel of R&D because the access to credit enables entrepreneurs 
the  go-ahead  with  positive  present-value  R&D  projects.  Since  only  a  subset  of  innovations  are 
patented and patents give the same weight to significant and insignificant innovations, the financial 
development indicator serves as a useful complement to patents for the innovative activity under the 
maintained hypothesis of Aghion et al. (2004, 2005).  
 
Table 8. Estimates of Eq. (6) in 5-, 10- and 15-year intervals  
 
Labor Productivity  TFP 
   5 years  10 years  15 years  5 years  10 years  15 years 
  -0.092  0.112  0.128  -0.073  0.194  0.211 
 
(0.038)  (0.086)  (0.080)  (0.176)  (0.001)  (0.024) 
  -0.008  -0.006  -0.008  -0.003  -0.002  0.011 
 
(0.082)  (0.186)  (0.195)  (0.743)  (0.794)  (0.640) 
  0.023  0.006  0.006  0.009  -0.002  -0.006 
 
(0.001)  (0.066)  (0.192)  (0.481)  (0.755)  (0.519) 
  0.003  0.001  0.001  0.001  -0.001  0.002 
 
(0.418)  (0.676)  (0.482)  (0.818)  (0.619)  (0.594) 
  0.012  0.010  0.013  0.020  0.015  0.033 
 
(0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.005)  (0.000) 
                                                           
10 The prediction of    > 0 is reverse of the empirical estimates of Aghion et al. (2004, 2005) because they measure the 
distance to the frontier as the minus of the DTF used here. 24 
 
  0.004  0.003  0.014  0.006  0.005  0.025 
 
(0.065)  (0.049)  (0.287)  (0.053)  (0.110)  (0.526) 
  0.068  0.016  0.084  0.118  0.076  0.244 
 
(0.042)  (0.617)  (0.024)  (0.022)  (0.103)  (0.008) 
  0.000  0.005  0.002  -0.006  0.005  0.004 
 
(0.960)  (0.250)  (0.583)  (0.563)  (0.371)  (0.641) 
  0.004  0.003  0.004  0.004  0.003  0.007 
 
(0.023)  (0.061)  (0.069)  (0.110)  (0.048)  (0.063) 
  0.162  0.053  0.040  0.148  0.010  -0.007 
 
(0.060)  (0.100)  (0.330)  (0.145)  (0.856)  (0.936) 
  -0.038  -0.030  -0.038  -0.034  -0.024  -0.031 
 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.006)  (0.205) 
  0.017  0.014  0.019  0.039  0.033  0.073 
   (0.028)  (0.081)  (0.053)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.026) 
Note. The figures in parenthesis are p-values  
 
The results of regressing Eq. (6) are presented in Table 8. The estimated coefficients of openness are 
positive and significant in some regressions while insignificant in others. Furthermore, the estimates 
support  the  financial  development  hypothesis  since  the  estimated  coefficients  of  the  interaction 
between financial development and DTF are positive and significant at the 11-percent level in all 
cases. The interaction terms become much more significant if DTF is omitted from the estimates (the 
results are not shown). Furthermore, consistent with the predictions of the model of Aghion et al. 
(2004,  2005)  the  coefficients  of  financial  development  are  not  significantly  different  from  zero. 
Overall, the regressions give strong support for the financial development hypothesis.  
  The estimated coefficients of the other conditioning variables are largely consistent with the 
estimates in the previous sub-section and, the coefficients of domestic research intensity and the 
distance  to  the  frontier  remain  highly  significant.  Furthermore,  the  coefficients  of  the  initial 
productivity  remain  insignificant  reinforcing  the  conclusion  from  the  previous  section  that  the 
convergence has been driven by the conditioning variables in the model. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
This paper has found strong evidence of manufacturing productivity convergence among the OECD 
countries  and  that  the  convergence  has  been  driven  by  research  intensity,  technology  spillovers 
through  the  channel  of  imports,  catching  up  to  the  technology  frontier  through  the  channel  of 
financial  development  and  catching  up  to  the  frontier  independently  of  financial  development. 
Focusing on a long historical time-span and using cross-section data, various tests gave evidence of 
-convergence as well as  -convergence. Further evidence of unconditional  -convergence is found 
in panel regressions using 5, 10 and 15  year differences.  However, initial income was rendered 25 
 
insignificant when growth is conditioned on domestic R&D, technology spillovers, the distance to 
the frontier and the interaction between financial development and the distance to the frontier, which 
suggests  that  these  variables  have  been  responsible  for  the  convergence.  Coupled  with  good 
institutions, the countries with low productivity back in 1870 increased the import of technology 
from  research  intensive  countries  and  took  advantage  of  their  backwardness  by  adapting  the 
technologies that were developed at the frontier. Financial development played an important role for 
countries to take advantage of their backwardness.  
  The  estimation  results  also  gave  insight  into  endogenous  growth  theories  by  explaining 
manufacturing  productivity  growth  in  the  industrial  countries  over  the  past  137  years.  Most 
endogenous growth theories suggest that growth is determined by domestic human capital, domestic 
R&D  and  international  technology  spillovers.  However,  growth  theories  have  quite  different 
implications for the functional relationship between growth and domestic as well as foreign R&D, 
due to differences in proliferation and scale effects in ideas production. The empirical estimates 
showed that the functional relationship between productivity growth, on the one hand, and domestic 
and foreign R&D on the other hand, follows the predictions of Schumpeterian growth theory and not 
that of semi-endogenous growth theory. It was found that domestic research intensity and foreign 
research  intensity  spillovers  through  the  channel  of  imports  have  permanent  growth  effects,  as 
predicted by Schumpeterian growth theories. These results are important because they show that 
manufacturing productivity growth will remain positive into the future provided that research effort 
remains  positive.  Furthermore,  since  convergence  has  been  almost  completed  among  OECD 
countries,  productivity  growth  rates  will  converge  provided  that  research  intensities  converge. 
Finally, the regressions showed that backward countries with a developed financial system could 
take  advantage  of  their  backwardness,  increase  their  innovative  activity  and  speed  up  their 
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Appendix. Results from using other estimators 
  Fixed Effects  OLS 
5 years  Full Model  Restricted 
Model  Full Model  Restricted 
Model 
   Y/L  TFP  Y/L  TFP  Y/L  TFP  Y/L  TFP 
  -0.010  -0.007  -0.005  0.006  -0.001  -0.005  -0.003  -0.002 
 
(0.238)  (0.603)  (0.266)  (0.372)  (0.840)  (0.737)  (0.586)  (0.860) 
  0.017  0.017  0.017  0.022  0.014  0.039  0.012  0.040 
 
(0.015)  (0.194)  (0.010)  (0.085)  (0.067)  (0.005)  (0.100)  (0.003) 
  0.006  0.003  0.006  0.003  0.008  0.005  0.009  0.005 
 
(0.102)  (0.530)  (0.100)  (0.531)  (0.056)  (0.425)  (0.049)  (0.420) 
  0.004  0.020  0.005  0.015  0.002  0.008  0.004  0.007 
 
(0.215)  (0.001)  (0.033)  (0.002)  (0.220)  (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.007) 
  0.004  0.006  0.005  0.007  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001 
 
(0.048)  (0.041)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.110)  (0.582)  (0.065)  (0.487) 
  0.149  0.265  0.147  0.225  0.095  0.155  0.124  0.155 
 
(0.093)  (0.030)  (0.087)  (0.054)  (0.175)  (0.097)  (0.069)  (0.070) 
  -0.033  -0.028  -0.033  -0.025  -0.028  -0.028  -0.029  -0.028 
 
(0.000)  (0.007)  (0.000)  (0.010)  (0.002)  (0.043)  (0.001)  (0.036) 
  0.015  0.029  0.022  0.057  0.001  0.003  0.016  0.023 
 
(0.479)  (0.353)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.940)  (0.916)  (0.049)  (0.118) 
  0.004  0.011       0.014  0.012       
 
(0.821)  (0.573)       (0.270)  (0.469)       
  0.001  -0.006       0.001  -0.002       
 
(0.575)  (0.210)       (0.358)  (0.385)       
  0.017  0.039       -0.005  0.006       
 
(0.465)  (0.262)       (0.659)  (0.751)       
C  0.105  0.046  0.085  -0.016  0.051  0.061  0.058  0.044 
   (0.059)  (0.604)  (0.055)  (0.814)  (0.344)  (0.570)  (0.246)  (0.634) 
 
 
Fixed Effects  OLS 
10 years  Full Model  Restricted 
Model  Full Model  Restricted 
Model 
   Y/L  TFP  Y/L  TFP  Y/L  TFP  Y/L  TFP 
  -0.008  -0.006  -0.007  0.001  -0.008  -0.009  -0.003  -0.006 
 
(0.238)  (0.626)  (0.059)  (0.828)  (0.238)  (0.369)  (0.349)  (0.340) 
  0.007  0.001  0.006  0.004  0.007  0.012  0.004  0.014 
 
(0.036)  (0.876)  (0.035)  (0.423)  (0.036)  (0.043)  (0.232)  (0.015) 
  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.003  0.001 
 
(0.714)  (0.823)  (0.665)  (0.888)  (0.714)  (0.768)  (0.315)  (0.784) 
  0.004  0.015  0.005  0.011  0.004  0.006  0.003  0.004 
 
(0.131)  (0.001)  (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.131)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.032) 
  0.003  0.004  0.004  0.005  0.003  0.000  0.001  0.000 
 
(0.039)  (0.121)  (0.009)  (0.018)  (0.039)  (0.950)  (0.058)  (0.782) 
  0.055  0.078  0.054  0.063  0.055  0.053  0.051  0.051 
 
(0.134)  (0.121)  (0.114)  (0.180)  (0.134)  (0.210)  (0.086)  (0.192) 
  -0.032  -0.025  -0.032  -0.025  -0.032  -0.030  -0.028  -0.030 
 
(0.000)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
  0.011  0.004  0.011  0.035  0.011  -0.010  0.012  0.012 
 
(0.533)  (0.864)  (0.041)  (0.000)  (0.533)  (0.641)  (0.004)  (0.093) 
  0.000  0.018      0.000  0.014       
 
(0.986)  (0.301)      (0.986)  (0.380)       
  0.001  -0.006      0.001  -0.003       
 
(0.526)  (0.091)      (0.526)  (0.164)       
  0.006  0.020      0.006  0.009       
 
(0.753)  (0.465)      (0.753)  (0.629)       
C  0.110  0.062  0.106  0.034  0.110  0.102  0.065  0.085 






Fixed Effects  OLS 
15 years  Full Model  Restricted 
Model  Full Model  Restricted 
Model 
   Y/L  TFP  Y/L  TFP  Y/L  TFP  Y/L  TFP 
  -0.019  0.009  -0.005  0.034  -0.004  -0.014  -0.005  0.002 
 
(0.062)  (0.815)  (0.321)  (0.045)  (0.519)  (0.587)  (0.330)  (0.874) 
  0.007  0.002  0.007  0.006  0.005  0.011  0.004  0.013 
 
(0.033)  (0.821)  (0.015)  (0.493)  (0.106)  (0.111)  (0.144)  (0.055) 
  0.003  0.006  0.003  0.005  0.004  0.006  0.004  0.006 
 
(0.096)  (0.089)  (0.040)  (0.094)  (0.059)  (0.108)  (0.044)  (0.112) 
  0.006  0.031  0.009  0.025  0.002  0.013  0.005  0.009 
 
(0.055)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.230)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
  0.021  0.040  0.013  0.043  0.014  0.016  0.013  0.020 
 
(0.089)  (0.159)  (0.264)  (0.124)  (0.054)  (0.305)  (0.064)  (0.198) 
  0.104  0.163  0.081  0.139  0.048  0.101  0.053  0.082 
 
(0.007)  (0.051)  (0.016)  (0.053)  (0.093)  (0.138)  (0.047)  (0.136) 
  -0.035  -0.012  -0.033  -0.008  -0.032  -0.043  -0.033  -0.040 
 
(0.000)  (0.623)  (0.000)  (0.674)  (0.000)  (0.040)  (0.000)  (0.025) 
  0.026  0.011  0.020  0.097  0.008  -0.010  0.013  0.036 
 
(0.226)  (0.815)  (0.004)  (0.000)  (0.625)  (0.783)  (0.017)  (0.038) 
  -0.010  0.045       0.007  0.022       
 
(0.552)  (0.151)       (0.583)  (0.382)       
  0.003  -0.015       0.002  -0.007       
 
(0.192)  (0.047)       (0.226)  (0.090)       
  0.046  0.061       0.002  0.034       
 
(0.085)  (0.380)       (0.869)  (0.352)       
C  0.116  -0.167  0.062  -0.300  0.059  0.105  0.067  0.011 
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